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From Plyler to Arizona: Have the Courts 
Forgotten about Corfield v Coryell ? 
John C. Eastmanf 
Introduction 
The theme of the Symposium at which this Article was pre- 
sented was Immigration Law and Institutional Design. Our mis- 
sion, as Symposium participants, was to assess the efficacy of 
the institutions that adopt and enforce our immigration laws. 
But before we can possibly make an efficacy assessment, we 
must address a normative question, namely, just what is it that 
our immigration laws seek to accomplish? It seems to me that 
there are three mutually exclusive alternatives or, perhaps more 
accurately, three principal points on a continuum of policy alter- 
natives: (1) open borders, with unconstrained immigration and 
naturalization; (2) closed borders, with no permanent immigra- 
tion and naturalization, only temporary visas for students, tour- 
ists, and so forth; and (3) controlled borders, with limited immi- 
gration and naturalization according to some established 
standard. 
In our nation's historical narrative, the first is best exempli- 
fied by the iconic words from the famous poem by Emma Laza- 
rus, penned to help raise funds for the construction of the Statue 
of Liberty's pedestal in the 1880s: "Give me your tired, your 
poor, / Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free."1 These 
t Henry Salvatori Professor of Law & Community Service, and former Dean, 
Chapman University School of Law. Dr. Eastman is also the founding director of the 
Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, a public interest law firm on whose behalf he 
has participated as amicus curiae in several Supreme Court cases related to the topic of 
the Symposium at which this Article was presented, including Hamdi v Rumsfeld , 542 
US 507 (2004), and Arizona v United States , 132 S Ct 2492 (2012). He has testified be- 
fore Congress (Oversight Hearing on Dual Citizenship, Birthright Citizenship, and the 
Meaning of Sovereignty before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and 
Claims of the House Committee onthe Judiciary , 109th Cong, 1st Sess 57 (2005)), the 
Arizona Legislature (both the Judiciary and Appropriations Committees on the Birth- 
right Citizenship State Compact bill, Feb 7 and 22, 2011, respectively), and the Califor- 
nia Legislature (Assembly Republican Task Force on Illegal Immigration, Oct 11, 2006), 
on matters related to the subject of this Symposium. The congressional testimony was 
subsequently published in the Texas Review of Law & Politics and the University of 
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words are widely believed to reflect the purpose of the Statue of 
Liberty, beckoning to the world an open borders US immigration 
policy. And they harken back to the very first days of the Repub- 
lic, when Thomas Paine called America "the asylum for the per- 
secuted lovers of civil and religious liberty from every part of 
Europe."2 
On the other end of the continuum are the various nativist 
movements that have held sway at various points in our nation's 
history, which have sought to severely curtail or even eliminate 
altogether immigration to the United States. Oftentimes tinged 
with racism or religious or ethnic bigotry, these movements have 
been most vibrant in reaction to large waves of immigration to 
the United States, particularly when combined with economic 
recessions or depressions. The American Party (or Know- 
Nothings) of the 1850s, with its opposition to Catholic immi- 
grants from Ireland and Germany;3 the Workingmen's Party of 
California and the Supreme Order of Caucasians, with their op- 
position to Chinese immigrants and successful advocacy for the 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882;4 the Immigration Restriction 
League of the 1890s,5 with its opposition to the influx of immi- 
grants from southern and eastern Europe; and the second Ku 
Klux Klan of the 1920s and 1930s, with its opposition to Catholic 
Richmond Law Review. John C. Eastman, Born in the U.S.A.? Rethinking Birthright Cit- 
izenship in the Wake of 9/11, 12 Tex Rev L & Polit 167 (2007); John C. Eastman, Born in 
the U.S.A.? Rethinking Birthright Citizenship in the Wake of 9/11, 42 U Richmond L Rev 
955 (2008). Other related publications include: John C. Eastman, The States Enter the 
Illegal Immigration Fray, in Carissa Hessick and Jack Chin, eds, Illegals in the Back- 
yard: State and Local Regulation of Immigration Policy (NYU forthcoming 2013); John 
C. Eastman, Papers , Please: Does the Constitution Permit he States a Role in Immigra- 
tion Enforcement?, 35 Harv J L & Pub Pol 1 (2012); John Eastman and Ediberto Román, 
Debate on Birthright Citizenship, 6 FIU L Rev 293 (2011); John C. Eastman and Karen 
J. Lugo, Arizona's Immigration Storm, 12 Engage 68 (June 2011). Portions of this Article 
have been drawn from some of those prior publications. 1 Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, in Emma Lazarus, 1 The Poems of Emma 
Lazarus 202, 203 (Houghton Mifflin 1889). 2 Moncure Daniel Conway, ed, 1 The Writings ofThomas Paine 87 (Putnam 1894) 
(emphasis omitted). 3 See Bruce Levine, Conservatism, Nativism, and Slavery: Thomas R. Whitney and 
the Origins of the Know-Nothing Party, 88 J Am Hist 455, 470-71 (2001). 4 See Doyce B. Nunis Jr, ed, The Demagogue and the Demographer: Correspond- 
ence of Denis Kearney and Lord Bryce, 36 Pac Hist Rev 269, 277-78 & n 6 (1967); Connie 
Young Yu, "The Indispensable Enemy," by Alexander Saxton, 8 Bull Concerned Asian 
Scholars 60, 60 (July-Sept 1976). 5 See Immigration Restriction League, Constitution f the Immigration Restriction 
League 1, online at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:FHCL:949025 (visited Mar3, 2013). See 
also Barbara Miller Solomon, The Intellectual Background ofthe Immigration Restriction 
Movement inNew England, 25 New Eng Q 47 (1952). 
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and Jewish immigrants,6 primarily from southern and eastern 
Europe, are just a few. 
In between is the controlled borders policy reflected by cur- 
rent federal immigration law - that is, the law on the books, not 
necessarily the law as it is enforced. And, truth be told, this is 
the policy reflected by the original Statue of Liberty story. The 
version of that story described above is actually anachronistic, 
driven more by Lazarus's poem and the chance location of the 
Statue near the immigrant processing center that opened on El- 
lis Island in 1892 than by the Statue's original purpose. Contra- 
ry to popular belief, the words are not engraved on the tablet 
Lady Liberty holds in her left arm - the inscription there is "Ju- 
ly 4, 1776" - but are engraved on a bronze plaque that was af- 
fixed to the base of the Statue in 1903 (now housed inside the 
museum), thirty years after the Statue was built and seventeen 
years after it was dedicated.7 
Instead, the Statue was intended to commemorate the suc- 
cess of the American Revolution and the vindication of the Revo- 
lution's ideals in the then-recently ended Civil War. It was orig- 
inally supposed to be dedicated in 1876 to mark the centennial 
of the Declaration of Independence. It was a gift from the people 
of France, who had helped make military success in the Ameri- 
can Revolution possible, but Edouard de Laboulaye, who pro- 
posed the Statue, also hoped that the Statue would inspire the 
French people to revive their own democracy in the face of what 
had again become a repressive monarchy. The famous torch that 
Lady Liberty holds above her head, like the Statue's original 
name, "Liberty Enlightening the World," was not so much a bea- 
con lighting the way for immigrants but rather a reflection of 
the shining "city on a hill"8 metaphor of America as an enlight- 
ened example of how to organize governmental institutions 
6 See Rory McVeigh, Structural Incentives for Conservative Mobilization : Power 
Devaluation and the Rise of the Ku Klux Klan, 1915-1925, 77 Soc Forces 1461, 1464 
(1999) ("Most of the [Ku Klux Klan's] venom was directed toward immigrants, Catholics, 
Jews, socialists, agrarian radicals, organized labor, urban machine politics, big business, 
vice, and immorality."). 7 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Tightening Circle of Membership , 22 Hastings 
Const L Q 915, 915 (1995). 8 See Perry Miller, ed, The American Puritans , Their Prose and Poetry 78, 83 (Co- 
lumbia 1982) ("For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all 
people are upon us."). 
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elsewhere in the world to secure the blessings of liberty for other 
nations' own peoples.9 
Nevertheless, these two dramatically different views of the 
Statue of Liberty story are playing out today in our national de- 
bate over immigration policy. Many who hold the "give me your 
tired, your poor, your huddled masses" open borders position re- 
ject the very idea of borders as a throwback to a nation-state 
mentality that developed as Europe was emerging from the 
Dark Ages. For them, the developing norms of human rights 
should guarantee to every human being unfettered access to ter- 
ritory and resources anywhere on the globe.10 Why should any- 
one have access to a better life merely because of the chance cir- 
cumstance of the location of their birth? This pseudo-Rawlsian 
view11 has been explicitly advanced in the immigration debate in 
such recent works as The Birthright Lottery by Professor Ayelet 
Shachar.12 
Those of both the controlled borders and closed borders posi- 
tions adhere to the view that national sovereignty still matters. 
For them, the idea that "peoples" form governments in order to 
best secure the inalienable rights of their own members, so elo- 
quently described in our Declaration of Independence, still pre- 
vails. Accordingly, just how much immigration to permit at any 
given time, and even from where, is a policy judgment that must 
be made by the nation's sovereign authority, wherever that au- 
thority is vested. For the closed borders crowd, that policy judg- 
ment must yield a ban on further immigration. For the con- 
trolled borders advocates, some level of immigration is not only 
permissible but cherished, though the precise level and the 
terms may vary from generation to generation (or even from 
year to year), depending on the circumstances. 
9 See John Bodnar, et al, The Changing Face of the Statue of Liberty, *5-6 (un- 
published paper, Indiana University, Dec 2005), online at http://www.cesu.umn.edu/ 
prod/groups/cfans/@pub/@cfans/@cesu/documents/asset/cfans_asset_360853.pdf (visited 
Mar 3, 2013). 10 See, for example, Barbara Hines, The Right o Migrate as a Human Right: The 
Current Argentine Immigration Law, 43 Cornell Intl L J 471, 488-93 (2010); Michael 
Huemer, Is There a Right o Immigrate Ì, 36 Soc Theory & Prac 429, 430 (2010). Interna- 
tional law does not currently recognize such a right o migrate into another country 
without that country's consent, however, only the right o migrate from or within one's 
own. See Resolution 21 7 A (III), UN General Assembly, 183d mtg (Dec 10, 1948), UN Doc 
A/810 74. 
11 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 60 (Belknap 1971). 12 Ayelet Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality 15 
(Harvard 2009). 
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From this brief descriptive introduction, the following insti- 
tutional questions arise. Which institution will make the basic 
policy judgment as to where on the continuum immigration poli- 
cy will be placed at any given time? And which institution or in- 
stitutions will best give effect to that policy judgment? Confu- 
sion about the answers to those questions, and the overlap 
between them, lies at the heart of much of the current contro- 
versy over immigration policy. 
I. Who Decides: International Law or Nation-State? 
There seem to be two principal alternative answers to the 
first question, which institution decides what immigration policy 
will be: (1) an international law body or (2) the sovereign author- 
ity of the nation. While the former could presumably establish 
something less than an open borders policy as the norm, the fact 
that, absent explicit treaty agreements by member nations 
(which would mean that the decision is really being authorized 
by the sovereign authority of those nations), the authority of 
such a body to act at all necessarily requires the recognition that 
there is a fundamental human right not just to emigrate (that is, 
leave one's country) but to immigrate (that is, enter into another 
country, without regard for the wishes of the existing occupants 
of that country).13 This would, of course, yield an open borders 
rule. 
There have been some moves in that direction recently. The 
recent Argentinean law, described by University of Texas clini- 
cal law professor Barbara Hines in her article, The Right to Mi- 
grate as a Human Right: The Current Argentine Immigration 
Law, is one such example.14 But as Professor Hines herself cor- 
rectly recognizes, the "principle [ ] is not found in the immigration 
laws of any other large immigrant-receiving country nor explicitly 
13 Although they seem to be the flip sides of the same coin, the right o emigrate 
(that is, leave one's country and even to disassociate from it by renouncing citizenship) 
and the right o immigrate present fundamentally different problems in determining 
whether they are fundamental human rights. The former, which is central to the Ameri- 
can claim of independence from Great Britain (the dispute over which continued into the 
War of 1812), can be exercised unilaterally, but the latter imposes on those in the receiv- 
ing nation and therefore should, under the consent rationale that undergirds the right o 
emigrate, require consent from the receiving nation. As such, one can speak of a right o 
seek to immigrate, but not an absolute right o immigrate even over the objection of the 
receiving nation. 14 Hines, 43 Cornell Intl L J at 488-510 (cited in note 10). See also Bruce A. 
Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 95 (Yale 1980). 
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in any international human rights conventions."15 And for this, 
she cites a slew of authority, from the European Union's policy 
statement on immigration;16 to statutory law in Canada, Austral- 
ia, New Zealand, and Japan;17 to various international treaties 
and conventions.18 Most particularly, Professor Hines recognizes 
that the "international human right to immigrate" principle is 
not and has not been the rule in the United States.19 As the Su- 
preme Court recognized long ago, "The right of a nation to expel 
or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken 
any steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon 
the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the 
right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country."20 
Whether the new Argentinean model ought to be the rule, 
therefore, it clearly is not the rule in the overwhelming number 
of jurisdictions, or in international law more broadly, or in the 
United States specifically. Rather, the principle set out in the 
US Declaration of Independence remains the almost universal 
international norm. "Peoples" form governments, "laying [their] 
foundation on such principles and organizing [their] powers in 
such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safe- 
ty and Happiness."21 It seems, then, that sovereignty still mat- 
ters and that the sovereign authority of each nation may still de- 
fine the terms upon which peoples from other parts of the globe 
may become part of its body politic. 
15 Hines, 43 Cornell Intl L J at 472 (cited in note 10). 16 European Commission, Communication from the Commission tothe European 
Parliament, he Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Commit- 
tee of the Regions: Towards a Common Immigration Policy *5 (May 12, 2007), online at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0780:FIN:EN:PDF 
(visited Mar 3, 2013) (describing EU management of illegal immigration, asylum, and 
migration a d border controls under the Tampere program). 17 Immigration a d Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, eh 27 § 27 (Can); Migration 
Act 1958, (Commonwealth), Act No 62 of 1958, Part 1 § 4(2) (Austl); Immigration Act 
1987, Public Act 1987 No 74, Part 1 § 4 (NZ); Immigration Control and Refugee Recogni- 
tion Act, Cabinet Order No 319 of 1951, Art 1 (Japan). 18 International Convention the Protection f the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families , UN General Assembly, 45th Sess (Dec 18, 1990), UN 
Doc A/45/49 261; Resolution 2200A (XXI), UN General Assembly, 1496th mtg (Dec 16, 
1966), UN Doc A/6316 54; Protocol No 4 , Eur Treaty Ser No 46, as amended by Protocol 
No 11, Eur Treaty Ser No 155 (1994), online at http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/ 
en/Treaties/Html/046.htm (visi ed Mar 3, 2013); Convention Human Rights, 1144 UN 
Treaty Ser 123, 150-51 (Nov 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978). 19 Hines, 43 Cornell Intl L J at 473 (cited in note 10). 20 Fong Yue Ting v United States, 149 US 698, 707 (1893). 21 United States Declaration of Independence 1 2 (1776). 
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II. Who Decides in the United States? 
That the sovereign authority of a nation can set immigra- 
tion policy as it sees fit does not answer the question of where 
that authority resides in any particular nation, of course. In 
some, a hereditary monarch or despot under some claim of di- 
vine right or just raw power may exercise the sovereign authori- 
ty and unilaterally determine immigration policy for the nation. 
In republican forms of government such as that of the United 
States, however, the ultimate sovereign authority rests with the 
people. 
Control over immigration and naturalization policy in the 
United States was, under the Articles of Confederation, original- 
ly left with the states. Article IV of the Articles merely required 
that each state afford to the free residents of other states the 
rights of ingress and egress and the basic privileges and immun- 
ities that it afforded to its own residents, leaving to each state 
the power to set its own immigration and naturalization policies 
beyond that. Unsurprisingly, that system proved unworkable. 
Not only did this result in widely varying practices - a problem 
that James Madison in Federalist 42 called a "defect" of the Ar- 
ticles22 - but the mandate that each State afford free ingress to 
the people of the other states meant, ultimately, that the state 
with the most permissive naturalization policy would set the 
rule for every other state. Accordingly, ever since 1789, the pow- 
er over naturalization has, by constitutional design, been vested 
in the national government. 
More precisely, the power is vested in Congress. Article I, 
Section 8, clause 4 expressly gives to Congress the power to "es- 
tablish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." For a short period 
under the new Constitution, there continued to be some dispute 
about whether the constitutional provision vested exclusive au- 
thority over naturalization in Congress. Alexander Hamilton, in 
Federalist 32, was of the view that the power was necessarily 
exclusive, or else there would not be a "uniform" rule.23 But even 
after Congress adopted its first "uniform Rule of Naturalization" 
statute in 1790, 24 some states continued to naturalize citizens on 
22 Federalist 42 (Madison), in The Federalist 279, 286-87 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob 
E. Cooke, ed). 23 Federalist 32 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 199, 201 (cited in note 22). 
24 Naturalization Act of 1790, ch 3, 1 Stat 103. 
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their own. That changed in 1795, when Congress added the 
phrase, "and not otherwise," to the federal immigration statute.25 
It should be emphasized that the power is vested specifically 
in Congress, not in the federal government more broadly. The 
Supreme Court has consistently held that the Constitution as- 
signs "plenary power over immigration policy to Congress,26 not 
to the president or to the courts. The power to exclude foreigners 
is an incident of sovereignty delegated by the Constitution to 
"the government of the United States, through the action of the 
legislative department."2,7 Indeed, the Court declared more than 
a century ago that "over no conceivable subject is the legislative 
power of Congress more complete than it is over" the admission 
of aliens.28 "[T]hat the formulation of [immigration] policies is 
entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly 
imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body poli- 
tic as any aspect of our government."29 
Congress can therefore impose restrictions on immigration 
and make it unlawful to immigrate to this country in violation of 
those restrictions. But by constitutional design, Congress cannot 
exercise the full measure of its plenary power over immigration 
alone. It is lawmaker, but not prosecutor, judge, or jury. In our 
constitutional system of checks and balances, the executive and 
judicial departments both have a role to play. And in our com- 
plex system of federalism, the states may have a role to play as 
well, even after the Constitution displaced the Articles of Con- 
federation. Ascertaining the boundaries of those various institu- 
tional roles is the source of much of the recent controversy over 
immigration policy and enforcement in recent decades. 
III. The Federalism Gloss 
Let me take up the federalism issue first. There is no ques- 
tion that, in exercising its plenary power over immigration, 
Congress can preempt state laws to the contrary.30 A state can- 
not authorize immigration into its territory by someone whom 
25 Naturalization Act of 1795, ch 20, 1 Stat 414. 26 See, for example, Kleindienst v Mandel , 408 US 753, 766 (1972). 27 Chae Chan Ping v United States, 130 US 581, 603 (1889) (emphasis added). 28 Oceanic Steam Navigation Co v Stranahan, 214 US 320, 339 (1909) (emphasis 
added). See also Fiallo v Bell, 430 US 787, 792 (1977). 29 Galvan v Press, 347 US 522, 531 (1954) (emphasis added). 30 See US Const Art VI, cl 2 ("[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the su- 
preme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution rLaws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding."). 
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Congress has barred from admission to the United States, nor 
can a state bar someone whom Congress has authorized. But 
that basic, and uncontested, proposition does not solve two re- 
lated issues. First, does the mere delegation to Congress of ple- 
nary power over naturalization preempt state laws, even before 
Congress has exercised that power? In other words, is there a 
sort of dormant Naturalization Clause limitation on states, 
comparable to the dormant Commerce Clause limitation?31 Sec- 
ond, to what extent does Congress's Naturalization Clause pow- 
er, whether exercised or dormant, impliedly preempt the states 
from exercising powers reserved to them, such as the police 
power, that though not a naturalization power itself neverthe- 
less might touch on immigration? Or, phrased differently, just 
how broad is implied field preemption or "obstacle" preemption 
in the immigration context?32 
A. Is There a Dormant Naturalization Clause? 
The first issue, is there a dormant Naturalization Clause, 
was presented to the courts in Hines v Davidowitz.33 At issue in 
that case was an alien registration law passed by Pennsylvania 
in 1939, which required all aliens over the age of eighteen to reg- 
ister annually with the state, pay a one-dollar annual registra- 
tion fee, and carry their registration card with them at all 
times.34 A three-judge district court enjoined the law as uncon- 
stitutional, holding that the law denied aliens the equal protec- 
tion of the laws and encroached upon legislative powers consti- 
tutionally vested in the federal government, essentially adopting 
a dormant Naturalization Clause theory because Congress had 
not yet legislated on the subject.35 But before the Supreme Court 
could hear the state's appeal, Congress adopted its own alien 
registration act, requiring that all aliens over the age of fourteen 
register a single time (rather than annually) with federal immi- 
gration officials.36 In addition to requiring less-frequent filing, 
the federal law did not require aliens to carry a registration 
31 See Willson vBlack Bird Creek Marsh Co, 27 US (2 Pet) 245, 252 (1829); C&A 
Carbone, Ine v Town of Clarkstown, New York , 511 US 383, 401-02 (1994). 32 See Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp , 331 US 218, 236 (1947); Caleb Nelson, 
Preemption, 86 Va L Rev 225, 227 (2000). 33 312 US 52 (1941). 34 Id at 59. 
35 Id at 60. 
36 Id. 
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card, and only willful failure (as opposed to Pennsylvania's any 
failure) to register was made a criminal offense.37 Federal penal- 
ties, however, were more stringent. Violation of the federal stat- 
ute was punishable by a fine of up to one thousand dollars, im- 
prisonment of not more than six months, or both, while violation 
of the Pennsylvania law was punishable by a fine of up to one 
hundred dollars, sixty days in jail, or both.38 
Although those challenging the Pennsylvania law argued 
that the law was unconstitutional even before adoption of the 
federal law, the Supreme Court declined to rule on those claims, 
"expressly leaving open . . . the argument that the federal power 
in this field, whether exercised or unexercised, is exclusive."39 
Instead, the Supreme Court held that 
When the national government by treaty or statute has estab- 
lished rules and regulations touching the rights, privileges, 
obligations or burdens of aliens as such, the treaty or stat- 
ute is the supreme law of the land. No state can add to or 
take from the force and effect of such treaty or statute.40 
There is language in the opinion suggesting that the Court 
might be open to a dormant Naturalization Clause analysis at 
some point. It explained the importance of leaving federal power 
in fields affecting foreign affairs "entirely free from local inter- 
ference," for example, lest the actions of one State create inter- 
national repercussions that affect the entire nation.41 But the ac- 
tual holding of the Court was more limited: 
[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its supe- 
rior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of 
regulation and has therein provided a standard for the reg- 
istration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the 
purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or 
complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxil- 
iary regulations.42 
The question left open in Hines has never been fully answered, 
and given the expansive coverage of current federal immigration 
37 Hines, 312 US at 60-61. 38 Id at 59-61. 
39 Id at 62. 
40 Id at 62-63 (emphasis added). 41 Hines ,312 US at 63-64. 42 Id at 66-67 (emphasis added). 
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law,43 it may never need to be answered. To be sure, the Supreme 
Court in De Canas v Bica,44 decided thirty-five years after Hines, 
upheld the exercise of state police power in areas that touch on 
immigration, thereby rejecting a strong version of a dormant Natu- 
ralization Clause theory that would bar the states from exercising 
non-naturalization powers in ways that might have some impact 
on naturalization policy.45 But that presents a somewhat different 
issue, taken up below. In the unlikely event that Congress 
should repeal the existing statutory scheme, whether the states 
could actually exercise a naturalization power, as some did in 
the early years after the Constitution's adoption, apparently re- 
mains an open question. 
B. Is There Implied Preemption of States' Non-naturalization 
Powers? 
Even if there is a dormant Naturalization Clause that re- 
stricts states from exercising naturalization powers in the ab- 
sence of Congressional action, that does not definitively resolve 
the related but distinct question of whether the states can exer- 
cise other powers that might overlap or touch on the objects of 
the naturalization power. The Constitution itself recognizes such 
a distinction in the analogous context of import taxes. The states 
are barred from levying import and export taxes "except what 
may be absolutely necessary for executing [their] inspection 
Laws."46 In other words, the power to tax imports and exports 
has been delegated exclusively to Congress, but the States can, 
in the exercise of their separate police powers to protect the 
health of their citizens, impose such a tax. 
Something similar is at work when the States exercise their 
police powers in ways that touch on immigration, but that do not 
actually amount to an exercise of a naturalization power. This is 
the key point of the holding in De Canas , in which the Supreme 
Court recognized that the states are not without authority to ex- 
ercise core state police powers even in matters that touch federal 
immigration policy. De Canas presented a challenge to a state 
statute prohibiting employers from knowingly employing unlaw- 
ful aliens on the ground that it amounted to state regulation of 
« See, for example, 8 USC § 1103(a)(5), INA § 103(a)(5). 
44 424 US 351 (1976). « Id at 365. 
« US Const Art I, § 10, cl 2. 
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immigration and thus was preempted by federal law.47 The 
Court held that federal immigration law did not prevent the 
states from regulating the employment of illegal aliens because 
states possess broad authority under their police powers to regu- 
late employment and protect workers within the state.48 "[T]he 
fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render 
it a regulation of immigration,"49 held the Court, thus apparently 
rejecting at least part of the challenge left unaddressed in Hines, 
namely, whether "the federal power in this field, whether exer- 
cised or unexercised, is exclusive."50 
That principle was applied in Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States v Whiting,61 in which the Supreme Court upheld 
the Legal Arizona Workers Act52 against challenges based on 
federal immigration law preemption.53 The Court held that the 
state law, which penalized employers of illegal aliens by with- 
drawing permission to do business in the state, a penalty much 
harsher than the fines imposed under federal immigration law, 
was not expressly preempted by federal law.54 On the contrary, 
the federal statute's preemption clause had an explicit exemp- 
tion for state licensing laws, and the Court rejected the argu- 
ment that the exemption should be read narrowly, in part be- 
cause the state was operating in an area of traditional state 
concern.55 More pertinent for present purposes, though, the 
Court also held that the state law was not implicitly preempt- 
ed.56 The Supreme Court has become increasingly suspicious of 
implied preemption claims in general, and that trend was mani- 
fested in the immigration context in Whiting : "Implied preemp- 
tion analysis does not justify a freewheeling judicial inquiry into 
whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives; 
such an endeavor would undercut the principle that it is Con- 
gress rather than the courts that preempts state law."57 A slight 
detour into preemption doctrine is therefore necessary to further 
the analysis. 
47 De Canas, 424 US at 352-53. 48 Id at 356-58. 
49 Id at 355. 
50 Hines ,312 US at 62. 51 131 SCt 1968(2011). 
52 2007 Ariz Sess Laws 1312, codified atAriz Rev Stat Ann § 23-211 et seq. 53 Whiting , 131 S Ct at 1981. 54 Id. 
55 Id at 1979-80. 
56 Id at 1985. 
57 Whiting, 131 S Ct at 1985 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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A "fundamental principle of the Constitution is that Con- 
gress has the power to preempt state law."58 Absent clearly ex- 
pressed intent by Congress, however, state law is not preempt- 
ed.59 Particularly in areas of traditional state regulation, the 
assumption is that a federal statute will not supersede state 
law, unless Congress has made such intention clear.60 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has maintained a presumption 
against preemption when analyzing preemption challenges per- 
taining to areas of law traditionally occupied by the states, such 
as employment relations.61 Such a presumption against preemp- 
tion would seem to be a necessary corollary to the basic struc- 
ture of federalism, for it is a mainstay of our federal system of 
government that, as James Madison himself observed in Feder- 
alist 45, "[t]he powers reserved to the several States will extend 
to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, con- 
cern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the in- 
ternal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State."62 
Immigration is not an area traditionally occupied by the 
states, of course, but employment relations, health and safety 
concerns, and other areas affected by immigration are. The is- 
sue, then, is whether the traditional presumption against 
preemption should be applied when those areas of traditional 
state concern touch on immigration matters.63 
The Court's decision in De Canas is instructive on this point. 
As noted above, that case involved a group of migrant farm 
workers who alleged that certain labor contractors were hiring 
undocumented workers in violation of a California statute.64 Re- 
spondents challenged the statute on the ground that it amount- 
ed to regulation of immigration and was therefore preempted by 
federal law. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the 
federal Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) did not preempt 
the California statute because the state statute was in harmony 
58 Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council , 530 US 363, 372 (2000). 59 See Rice, 331 US at 230. 
60 See id. See also Medtronic, Ine v Lohr , 518 US 470, 485 (1996) (presuming that 
Congress does not "cavalierly" preempt state law, particularly in areas of law where the 
states have strong authority); Bates v Dow AgroSciences LLC , 544 US 431, 449 (2005) (stat- 
ing that he Supreme Court has a duty to accept a reading that disfavors preemption). 61 See, for example, Napier v Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co, 272 US 605, 611 
(1926); Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111, United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of 
America vWisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 US 740, 749 (1942). 62 Federalist 45 (Madison), in The Federalist 308, 313 (cited in note 22). 
63 See Rice, 331 US at 230-31. 
64 De Canas ,424 US at 353. 
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with federal regulation.65 The Court further concluded that re- 
spondents failed to identify anything in the plain language of 
the INA or its legislative history that warranted the conclusion 
that the INA was intended to preempt "harmonious state regu- 
lation touching on aliens in general, or the employment of illegal 
aliens in particular."66 In other words, the Court applied a pre- 
sumption against preemption even in areas that touch upon 
immigration, stating, 
[W]e will not presume that Congress, in enacting the INA, 
intended to oust state authority to regulate ... in a manner 
consistent with pertinent federal laws. Only a demonstra- 
tion that complete ouster of state power - including state 
power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws - 
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress would justi- 
fy that conclusion.67 
The Arizona SB 107068 statute that has generated so much 
controversy of late is for the most part to the same effect. Arizo- 
na did not purport to make any policy over who should be admit- 
ted or allowed to stay in this country. Instead, the Arizona law 
for the most part expressly followed congressional policy - and 
indeed mirrored the provisions of the federal law.69 Arizona's law 
incorporates provisions from federal law and promotes compli- 
ance with those provisions.70 Subsection (L) of § 2 of the Act spe- 
cifically provides that the section "shall be implemented in a 
manner consistent with federal laws regulating immigration, 
protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privi- 
leges and immunities of United States citizens."71 And the law 
expressly provides that its terms "shall be construed to have the 
meanings given to them under federal immigration law"72 and 
that the "act shall be implemented in a manner consistent with 
federal laws regulating immigration."73 Arizona's SB 1070 is 
65 De Canas, 424 US at 357-58 n 5. 66 Id at 358. 
67 Id at 357 (quotation marks omitted). 68 Support Our Law Enforcement a d Safe Neighborhoods Act (SB 1070), 2010 Ariz 
Sess Laws 113, as amended by HB 2162, 2010 Ariz Sess Laws 211. 69 See Plyler v Doe , 457 US 202, 225 (1982) (recognizing that states have authority 
to act with respect o illegal aliens where action "mirrors federal objectives and furthers 
a legitimate state goal"). 70 See Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 41-1724(B)-(C). 71 Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 11-1051(L). 72 Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 41- 1724(B). 73 Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 41-1724(C). 
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therefore not a direct regulation of immigration, nor does it con- 
flict with congressional policy, at least for the most part. The 
Supreme Court did uphold a preliminary injunction against 
three of the roughly twenty substantive sections and subsections 
of the Act in Arizona u United States,74 of course, but the re- 
mainder of the Act, including the "show me your papers" section, 
was allowed to go into effect.75 
Arizona is not alone in seeking to exercise non- 
naturalization powers to deal with the consequences of lacklus- 
ter enforcement of existing federal immigration law. In 2011 
alone, state legislators across the nation introduced 1,607 bills 
and resolutions relating to immigrants and refugees in all fifty 
74 132 S Ct 2492 (2012). 
75 Compare 8 USC § 1324(a), with Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 13-1509, preemption recog- 
nized in Arizona , 132 S Ct at 2503; Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 13-2928(C), preemption recog- 
nized in Arizona , 132 S Ct at 2505; Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 13-3883, preemption recognized 
in Arizona , 132 S Ct at 2507. The three provisions that were enjoined include § 3, which 
created a separate state law crime for failure to carry immigration papers as required by 
federal law. That section expressly "does not apply to a person who maintains authoriza- 
tion from the federal government to remain in the United States," and it imposed the 
identical punishment provided by federal law. Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 13-1509, preemption 
recognized in Arizona , 132 S Ct at 2503. Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the Court 
in Arizona , erroneously held that the Arizona law imposed a more severe sanction than 
federal law because, in an entirely unrelated part of the United States Code, a generic 
criminal provision provided for probation for misdemeanor ffenses. Justice Kennedy 
claimed that because the Arizona law provided no such alternative, it was not a mirror of 
federal aw and was therefore invalid. But Justice Kennedy overlooked the savings 
clause of the Arizona statute, § 11(C), which provides that the "act shall be implemented 
in a manner consistent with federal laws regulating immigration, protecting the civil 
rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities ofUnited States citi- 
zens." Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 41-1724. If the generic federal probation provision i  Title 18 
modified the federal immigration laws in Title 8, as Justice Kennedy interpreted, then 
that became a "federal law regulating immigration" that should have triggered the Ari- 
zona statute's avings clause and imported a probation option to the Arizona statute as 
well. Nevertheless, because the Arizona statute also potentially subjected offenders to
double prosecution  a specific matter already governed by federal law, it could do more 
than just mirror the federal law, and was constitutionally suspect on that ground. 
Section 5(C) was also enjoined. That section imposed sanctions on employees who 
have entered into an employment relationship not authorized by federal law, whereas 
federal aw imposes anctions only on employers. Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 13-2928(C), 
preemption recognized in Arizona , 132 S Ct at 2505. Congress considered sanctions on 
employees as well but specifically declined to adopt such sanctions as part of the federal 
statutory scheme. The Arizona Court found that legislative history sufficient to preempt 
these provisions of the Arizona law. For the reasons that I explore in greater detail in 
John C. Eastman, Papers, Please: Does the Constitution Permit he States a Role in Im- 
migration Enforcement ?, 35 Harv J L & Pub Pol 569, 585-86 (2012), I think the Court's 
analysis missed the federalism principle that the Court understood correctly in De 
Canas. 
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states and Puerto Rico.76 This is a significant increase compared 
with 2010, when forty-six states considered more than 1,400 
bills and resolutions pertaining to immigrants.77 Several states 
have introduced legislation that is substantially similar to Ari- 
zona's SB 1070.78 Out of these efforts have come new laws in 
several states dealing with the collateral effects of illegal immi- 
gration. These state enactments enhance enforcement of federal 
immigration law in an effort to avoid economic hardship, as well 
as to ensure safe living and work environments for all residents. 
In 2007, New Jersey enacted Directive 2007-3, 79 which pro- 
vides guidelines establishing the manner in which local, county, 
and state law enforcement agencies interact with federal immi- 
gration authorities.80 The Directive states that "[s]tate, county, 
and local law enforcement agencies necessarily and appropriate- 
ly should inquire about a person's immigration status," specifi- 
cally when a person has been arrested for a serious violation of 
state criminal law.81 
Rhode Island enacted Executive Order 08-0 182 (Illegal Im- 
migration Control Order) in 2008. The Order states: 
WHEREAS, Congress and the President have been unable 
to resolve the problem of illegal immigration, leaving the 
states to deal with the consequences of 11 to 20 million ille- 
gal immigrants residing in the United States ... it is urged 
that all law enforcement officials, including state and local 
76 See National Conference ofState Legislatures, Immigration Policy Project: 2011 
Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States (2011), online at http://www 
.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/state-immigration-legislation-report-dec-2011.aspx (vis- 
ited Mar 3, 2013). 77 See id. 
78 See, for example, Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection 
Act (HB 56), 2011 Ala Laws 535, codified at Ala Code § 31-13-1 et seq; Illegal Immigra- 
tion Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011 (HB 87), 151st Ga General Assembly (2011); 
SB 590, 117th Ind General Assembly (2011); State of New Jersey Office of the Attorney 
General, Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No 2007-3 (Aug 22, 2007); Support 
Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (HB 4305), 96th Mich Legis (2011); 
Support Our Law Enforcement a d Safe Neighborhoods Act (HF 3830), 86th Minn Legis 
(2010); State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Executive Order 08-01: Illegal 
Immigration Control Order (Mar 27, 2008); South Carolina Illegal Immigration Reform 
Act (HB 4400), 2008 SC Acts & Resol 280; Utah Illegal Immigration E forcement Act 
(HB 116, HB 466, HB 469, and HB 497), 59th Utah State Legis (2011). 79 State of New Jersey Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Law En- 
forcement Directive No 2007-3 (Aug 22, 2007) ("NJ AG Directive No 2007-3"). 80 NJ AG Directive No 2007-3 at 1. 
81 NJ AG Directive No 2007-3 at 1. 
82 State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Executive Order 08-01: Illegal 
Immigration Control Order (Mar 27, 2008) ("RI EO 08-01"). 
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law enforcement agencies take steps to support the en- 
forcement of federal immigration laws by investigating and 
determining the immigration status of all non-citizens.83 
Rhode Island found it necessary to enact this Order because "the 
presence of significant numbers of people illegally residing in 
the state of Rhode Island creates a burden on the resources of 
state and local human services, law enforcement agencies, edu- 
cational institutions and other governmental institutions," as 
well as diminishes opportunities for citizens and legal immi- 
grants of Rhode Island.84 Additionally, Rhode Island's Order spe- 
cifically states that nothing in the Order "shall be construed to 
supersede, contravene or conflict with any federal or state law or 
regulation" and that state and local law enforcement agencies 
are "urged . . . [to] take steps to support the enforcement of fed- 
eral immigration laws."86 
South Carolina's HB 440086 (South Carolina Illegal Immi- 
gration Reform Act) requires employers doing business in South 
Carolina to either participate in the federal E-Verify program, or 
only hire employees who possess or qualify for a South Carolina 
driver's license (or another state license with similar require- 
ments).87 This legislation protects those who are not legal resi- 
dents of the state from the potential of abuse from employers 
who may wish to hire them at low wages or force them to work 
in unsafe and unhealthy conditions.88 
In Michigan, lack of immigration enforcement led to a drain 
on the state's economy, causing one of the nation's highest un- 
employment rates and an exodus of its own residents. This 
prompted Michigan to introduce the Support Our Law Enforce- 
ment and Safe Neighborhoods Act,89 which requires government 
agencies to verify the immigration status of people eighteen 
years old or older who apply for federal, state, or local public 
benefits.90 The Act specifically states that "the provisions of this 
[A]ct shall be implemented in a manner consistent with federal 
laws regulating immigration while protecting the civil rights of 
S3 RI EO 08-01 at 1, 3. 
84 RI EO 08-01 at 1. 
85 RI EO 08-01 at 3. 
se 2008 SC Acts & Resol 280. 
87 SC Code Ann § 41-8-20(B)(l)-(2). 88 SC Code Ann § 41-8-20(B)(l)-(2). 89 HB 4305, 96th Mich Legis (201 1). 
90 HB 4305 §3, 96th Mich Legis (2011). 
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all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of 
United States citizens."91 Additionally, the Act makes clear that 
no agency or political subdivision of the state of Michigan is al- 
lowed to adopt a policy that limits or restricts the enforcement of 
federal immigrations laws.92 
In order to deal with the strain on its economy, Alabama in- 
troduced HB 5693 (Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Cit- 
izen Protection Act). This legislation requires police to check the 
status of anyone they suspect may be in the country illegally 
when they are stopped for another reason.94 It also makes it a 
criminal offense to provide transportation or housing to anyone 
not legally in the United States95 and enforces penalties on any 
business that knowingly employs any person who is in the coun- 
try unlawfully.96 Perhaps most significantly, it requires school 
districts to gather data about the number of illegal immigrant 
children who were attending the public schools of the state.97 
Alabama's decision to introduce this legislation was based 
on the economic hardship due to costs incurred by school dis- 
tricts for public elementary and secondary education of children 
who are "aliens not lawfully present in the United States."98 The 
drain on Alabama's educational funding was adversely affecting 
the availability of public education resources to students who 
are US citizens or who are aliens that are lawfully present in 
the United States.99 Alabama determined that there was a 
"compelling need" for the State Board of Education to accurately 
measure and assess the population of students that are aliens 
unlawfully present in the United States.100 This measure of the 
population was not instituted as a way to deport those who are 
unlawfully present or exclude them from public education. Ra- 
ther, it allows the state to forecast and plan for any impact that 
the presence of such a population may have on publicly funded 
education. Furthermore, Alabama enacted this legislation in an 
91 HB 4305 § 2, 96th Mich Legis (201 1). 92 HB 4305 § 4(1), 96th Mich Legis (2011). 93 Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (HB 56), 2011 
Ala Legis 535, codified atAla Code §31-13-1 et seq. 94 Ala Code § 31-13-12(a). 95 Ala Code § 31-13-13. 96 Ala Code § 31-13-15(a). 97 Ala Code § 31-13-27. 
98 Ala Code § 31-13-2. 99 Ala Code « 31-13-2. 
100 Ala Code § 31-13-2. 
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effort to fully comply with federal law.101 Alabama found that cer- 
tain practices previously allowed were actually impeding the en- 
forcement of federal immigration law. Therefore, Alabama adopt- 
ed the Act to require all agencies within the state to fully 
cooperate with federal immigration authorities in the enforce- 
ment of federal immigration laws.102 
Minnesota's HF 3830103 (Support Our Law Enforcement and 
Safe Neighborhoods Act) was introduced in response to the 
state's finding that there is a compelling interest in the coopera- 
tive enforcement of federal immigration laws throughout Minne- 
sota.104 The provisions of the Act are intended to work together 
"to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of al- 
iens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the 
United States."105 
Utah's HB 497106 addresses law enforcement, REAL ID (a 
program that sets forth the requirements necessary for a state 
driver's license or ID card to be accepted by the federal govern- 
ment for official purposes, as defined by the Secretary of Home- 
land Security), and public benefits.107 The legislation requires the 
verification of immigration status regarding application for public 
services or benefits provided by a state or local governmental 
agency or subcontractor, 
" 
except as exempted by federal law ."108 
Indiana's SB 590109 establishes state crimes for the posses- 
sion of false identification, identity fraud, and the transport or 
harboring of those unlawfully in the state.110 Additionally, state 
agencies, political subdivisions, and contractors with public con- 
tracts for services with the state or political subdivision are re- 
quired to use E-Verify (an Internet-based, free program run by 
the US government that compares information from an employ- 
ee's Employment Eligibility Verification Form 1-9 to data from 
US government records).111 State agencies and localities must 
101 Ala Code § 31-13-2. 102 Ala Code § 31-13-2. 103 HF 3830, 86th Minn Legis (2010). 104 HF 3830 § 2, 86th Minn Legis (2010). 
105 HF 3830 § 2, 86th Minn Legis (2010). 106 HB 497, 59th Utah State Legis (2011). 107 HB 497 §§ 4-8, 59th Utah State Legis (2011). 108 HB 497 at 2, 59th Utah State Legis (2011) (emphasis added) (highlighted provisions). 109 SB 590, 117th Ind General Assembly (2011). 110 SB 590 SS 19, 23-24, 117th Ind General Assembly (2011). 
111 SB 590 § 17, 117th Ind General Assembly (2011). 
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verify eligibility for federal, state, and local benefits, and unem- 
ployment compensation.112 
And Georgia's HB 87113 (Illegal Immigration and Enforce- 
ment Act of 2011) requires employers with more than four work- 
ers to verify the immigration status of new hires using the fed- 
eral E-Verify database.114 
Each state has enacted legislation that is completely con- 
sistent with federal law and has done so based on legitimately 
serious concerns over the consequences of nonenforcement of 
federal immigration policies. These concerns implicate police 
powers, not naturalization powers. Thus, while all of these state 
laws touch on immigration, under the line of demarcation set 
out in De Canas, most of the provisions should be constitutional- 
ly valid. The Supreme Court's decision in Arizona has now 
blurred that line, however. 
The seeds for the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona were 
sown in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in the case. That opinion 
was, as I have noted elsewhere, based on a glaring and broad 
conceptual error about the import of the distinction between po- 
lice powers, which are reserved to the states, and naturalization 
powers, which are not.115 The Ninth Circuit panel noted early in 
the opinion, for example, that "Congress has instructed under 
what conditions state officials are permitted to assist the Execu- 
tive in the enforcement of immigration laws."116 Later, it held 
that "Subsection (g)(10) [of 8 USC § 1357] does not operate as a 
broad alternative grant of authority for state officers to system- 
atically enforce the INA outside of the restrictions set forth in 
subsections (g)(l)-(9)."117 And it contended that its restrictive in- 
terpretation of the derivation of state authority is bolstered by 
8 USC § 1103(a)(10), which authorizes the attorney general to 
deputize state and local law enforcement officers "[i]n the event 
the Attorney General determines that an actual or imminent 
mass influx of aliens arriving off the coast of the United States, or 
near a land border, presents urgent circumstances requiring an 
immediate Federal response."118 "If subsection (g)(10) meant that 
state and local officers could routinely perform the functions of 
112 SB 590 § 15, 117th Ind General Assembly (2011). 113 HB 87, 151st Ga General Assembly (2011). 114 HB 87 §§ 2, 12, 151st Ga General Assembly (2011). 115 See Eastman, 35 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 585-86 (cited in note 75). 116 United States v Arizona , 641 F3d 339, 348 (9th Cir 2011). 117 Id at 349. 
118 Id at 350 n 9, citing INA § 103(a)(10), 8 USC § 1103(a)(10). 
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DHS officers outside the supervision of the Attorney General," the 
court asserted, "there would be no need for Congress to give the 
Attorney General the ability, in § 1103(a)(10), to declare an actual 
or imminent mass influx of aliens, and to authorize any State or 
local law enforcement officer to perform the functions of a DHS 
officer."119 
These statements reveal a fundamental conceptual misun- 
derstanding of federalism. States do not derive their authority to 
act from the federal Constitution, nor do they require the ap- 
proval of federal officials or an Act of Congress to exercise police 
powers in their own states. The federal Constitution serves only 
to limit state authority where specified.120 Conversely, the feder- 
al government both derives its authority from the federal Con- 
stitution and is limited by it. It is no surprise, then, that in each 
of the statutes that the Ninth Circuit cited dealing with federal- 
state enforcement cooperation, authorization is given to federal 
officials to enter into such agreements.121 No such authorization 
is given to the states, because none is needed. Indeed, quite the 
opposite is true. For example, as INA § 103(a)(10) makes clear, 
the Attorney General's ability to enlist officials in federal en- 
forcement efforts is contingent on "the consent of the head of the 
department, agency, or establishment under whose jurisdiction 
the individual is serving."122 To hold otherwise, as the Ninth Cir- 
cuit did, is to answer the question left open by the Supreme 
Court in Hines in the negative and to repudiate the Supreme 
Court's holding in De Canas. 
While not as stark, the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona 
also rested on that fundamental error.123 Nevertheless, by up- 
holding § 2(B) of the Arizona statute, and leaving in place the 
lower court's decision not to enjoin the bulk of the statute, much 
of the principled line drawn in De Canas remains intact. Many 
of the state statutes referenced above should therefore survive 
constitutional challenge. 
119 Arizona , 641 F3d at 350 n 9 (quotation marks omitted). 120 As originally written, the Constitution s restrictions onstate authority are in Ar- 
ticle I, § 10. The list of restrictions was broadened rather dramatically with the Civil 
War Amendments and the subsequent incorporation of the Bill of Rights, but neither of 
those developments altered the fact that the states do not derive their authority to act 
from the federal Constitution. 
121 See INA § 103(a)(10), 8 USC § 1103(a)(10); INA § 287(g)(1), 8 USC § 1357(g)(1). 122 INA§ 103(a)(10), 8 USC § 1103(a)(10). 123 Arizona , 132 S Ct at 2506. 
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IV. The Separation of Powers Gloss 
Let me turn now to the issues that flow from the constitu- 
tional separation of powers between the branches of the federal 
government, first regarding the role of the executive and ulti- 
mately regarding the role of the judiciary as part of the whole 
institutional design that was the subject of the symposium at 
which this Article was presented. 
A. The Role of the President 
If one accepts the historically recognized proposition that 
the Constitution vests plenary power to set immigration and 
naturalization policy in the Congress and the further De Canas 
proposition that, while the states may not be able to exercise 
naturalization powers, they do have significant authority to ex- 
ercise their police powers even in areas that touch upon immi- 
gration, then the basic premise advanced by the Department of 
Justice in the Arizona litigation is rather startling. That prem- 
ise was essentially that, despite existing federal immigration 
laws on the books, a unilateral determination by the president 
not to enforce those laws preempts any state efforts to augment 
enforcement if they deem such efforts helpful in the exercise of 
their police powers. Happily, the Supreme Court's reasoning in 
the case did not embrace that proposition. 
The president has the same discretion in enforcing the pro- 
visions of the INA as he does with enforcing other federal stat- 
utes, of course. But the contention that such discretion permits 
the president to override state laws that are consistent with a 
policy set down by Congress is a rather broad expansion of pros- 
ecutorial discretion (albeit one hinted at by Justice Antonin 
Scalia in Printz v United States124). 
Such a claim seems inconsistent with the statutory scheme 
actually adopted by Congress, and it therefore undermines the 
124 521 US 898, 922-23 (1997): 
The Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws 
enacted by Congress; the President, itsays, shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed .... The Brady Act effectively transfers this responsibility 
to thousands of [state officers] in the 50 States, who are left o implement the 
program without meaningful Presidential control .... The insistence of the 
Framers upon unity in the Federal Executive ... is well known. That unity 
would be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject o reduc- 
tion, if Congress could act as effectively without the President as with him, by 
simply requiring state officers toexecute its laws. 
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long-standing position that power to set naturalization and im- 
migration policy is a plenary power of Congress. The statutory 
provisions acknowledge important roles for state and local offi- 
cials to play in the enforcement of federal immigration law. The 
Attorney General is to communicate with state officials regard- 
ing the immigration status of individuals, for example, even if 
there is no agreement with the federal government for a formal 
cooperative enforcement program.125 Additionally, Congress im- 
posed a duty on federal immigration officials to "respond to an 
inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking 
to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of 
any individual."126 If Congress wanted to give federal immigra- 
tion officers discretion as to whether to answer state and local 
citizenship inquiries, it could have used the word "may" instead 
of "shall" in § 1373(c). 
Indeed, Congress's requirement that the federal government 
respond to state and local inquiries into immigration status quite 
clearly indicates that states are free to "cooperate with the Attor- 
ney General in the identification, apprehension, detention, or re- 
moval of [illegal] aliens."127 It is thus clear from the text of 
§ 1373(c) that Congress wanted states to help enforce its immigra- 
tion policy, and it is for this reason that the Supreme Court did 
not uphold the injunction against § 2(b) of the Arizona statute.128 
A claim of extensive executive power or "global" enforcement 
discretion in the immigration arena that is contrary to the ex- 
pressed policy of Congress is unsupported by Supreme Court 
precedent that has recognized executive branch prosecutorial 
discretion. Rather, the discretion that has been afforded to the 
executive itself derives from acts of Congress.129 There is thus no 
basis for the claim that the president has the power to pursue a 
comprehensive and sweeping immigration scheme that runs 
counter to the statutory provisions already created by Congress. 
Although Congress has indeed vested the executive branch with 
125 INA § 287(e)(10)(A), 8 USC S 1357(g)(10)(A). 
126 8 USC § 1373(c). 127 INA § 287(g)(10(B), 8 USC § 1357(g)(10)(B). 128 See Arizona, 132 S Ct at 2508. 
129 See Knauff v Shaughnessy , 338 US 537, 540 (1950) (upholding a determination 
by the attorney general acting pursuant to authority conferred by statute to bar entry on 
national security grounds to an individual immigrant); INS v Aguirre- Aguirre, 526 US 
415, 425 (1999) (upholding a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals acting 
pursuant o authority conferred by statute not to withhold eportation f an individual 
alien who faced possible political persecution when that alien had been involved with 
nonpolitical crimes). 
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a considerable degree of discretion for purposes of enforcing the 
INA, this discretion has historically been limited to individual 
remedies in particular cases.130 Executive discretion simply is 
not sufficient for the president to override state laws that are 
consistent with the expressed policy of Congress. As Justice 
Samuel Alito recognized in his concurring opinion in the Arizona 
case, "The United States' argument that § 2(B) [of the Arizona 
statute] is pre-empted, not by any federal statute or regulation, 
but simply by the Executive's current enforcement policy is an 
astounding assertion of federal executive power that the Court 
rightly rejects."131 
In the Arizona litigation, the Department of Justice also relied 
on the president's foreign policy powers in addition to his prosecu- 
torial powers. It contended that the president's policy of nonen- 
forcement was permitted by the president's powers in the realm of 
foreign affairs, and that any attempt by any state to assist in the 
enforcement of immigration statutes adopted by Congress would 
interfere with those powers and necessitate preemption.132 
Although the Department's premise was correct - the presi- 
dent is the nation's chief organ in the field of foreign affairs133 - 
the superstructure it attempted to erect on that premise would 
have pushed the authority well beyond the breaking point. 
The president can of course negotiate a treaty that touches 
on a policy such as immigration, and once ratified by the Senate, 
that treaty has the force of law.134 However, until this happens, 
an un-ratified treaty does not preempt state law. Necessarily, 
then, informal diplomatic discussions cannot do so. Moreover, 
even a ratified treaty must give way to a subsequent act of Con- 
gress in an area within the legislative authority of Congress, 
particularly Congress's plenary power over immigration.136 
Medellin v Texas 136 is on point. There, the President sought 
to transform international obligations under a non- self- 
executing treaty into binding federal law that was operative 
130 See, for example, Knauff, 338 US at 540; Aguirre- Aguirre, 526 US at 431; INS v 
Chadha , 462 US 919, 923 (1983). 131 Arizona , 132 S Ct at 2524 (Alito concurring). 132 See Brief or the United States, Arizona v United States , No 11-182, *13-14 (US 
filed Mar 19, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 939048). 133 See United States v Cur tiss -Wright Export Corp , 299 US 304, 319 (1936). 134 US Const Art VI, cl 2 (declaring that treaties made under the "[a]uthority of the 
United States" are the supreme law of the land). 135 See Chae Chan Ping v United States, 130 US 581, 600 (1889). 136 5 52 US 491 (2008). 
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against the states, without an act of Congress. Although the Su- 
preme Court recognized that the president has an array of polit- 
ical and diplomatic means available to enforce international ob- 
ligations, it held the ability to unilaterally convert a non-self- 
executing treaty into a self-executing one is not among them. 
The responsibility for "transforming an international obligation 
arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls 
to Congress."137 The Court emphasized that the president's au- 
thorization to represent the United States in an international 
context speaks only to his international responsibilities - it does 
not grant him the unilateral authority to create domestic law.138 
What the Court held in Medellin was even truer in the Ari- 
zona case because the United States in that case was not relying 
on any treaty, but merely on a theory of the president's amor- 
phous authority over foreign affairs and diplomacy. As Medellin 
makes clear, more than simply the president's say-so would be 
required if such an interest could ever be sufficient to negate a 
state's attempt to assist with the enforcement of immigration 
laws that have been duly enacted by Congress. 
Without the more formal process for creating domestic law 
that Medellin requires, state judges and officials must enforce 
federal law as it is written, and not as the president would like 
it to be, a point made explicit by Article VI of the Constitution.139 
Arizona had simply authorized its own officials to assist in that 
effort. Because that vindicates rather than undermines the poli- 
cy determinations made by Congress, despite an apparently dif- 
ferent set of policy determinations emanating from the Execu- 
tive branch, the institutional design we have, which assigns 
plenary power in this area to Congress, could not countenance 
that aspect of the president's claims. 
B. The Role of the Supreme Court 
Finally, we turn to the tantalizing question suggested by the 
title of this Article. If we accept the premise that Congress has 
plenary power in this area, the adjudicative function of the courts 
must further, rather than undermine, the policy judgments made 
137 Id at 525-26. 
13® Id at 529-30. 
139 US Const Art VI, cl 2 (mandating that "the Judges in every State shall be bound" 
by the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States); US Const Art VI, cl 3 (pro- 
claiming that "all executive [officers] ... of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or 
Affirmation, to support this Constitution"). 
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by Congress, to the extent permitted by other provisions of the 
Constitution. So just what is the role of the courts in the institu- 
tional design, and have they performed that role properly? 
In addressing that question, I want to focus on what I con- 
sider to be the three principal magnets for illegal immigration, 
which is to say, the three principal challenges to implementation 
of the policy decisions that Congress has made: (1) better em- 
ployment prospects in the United States than exist in the illegal 
immigrant's country of origin; (2) access to better social welfare 
benefits (education, health care, infrastructure, poverty- support 
programs, and so forth); and (3) citizenship for the illegal immi- 
grant's children and, perhaps, for the illegal immigrant himself. 
And here, I'd like to advance the proposition that the Su- 
preme Court's decisions in all three areas have enhanced the 
magnetic attraction for illegal immigration and have thereby 
undermined congressional policy choices. If those decisions are 
truly compelled by the Constitution, then the impediment is one 
with which Congress simply must live. But if they misconstrue 
the Constitution's limits on congressional power, they needlessly 
thwart Congress's efforts, resulting in institutional conflict that 
flows from advancing contradictory policy goals. Although I 
think the employment magnet may provide the strongest attrac- 
tion for illegal immigration, I'd like to start with the social wel- 
fare magnet because I think the Court's major decision on that 
issue most clearly demonstrates the Court's erroneous constitu- 
tional premise. 
The leading Supreme Court case addressing restrictions on 
delivery of government services to illegal immigrants, of course, is 
Ply 1er v Doe,140 in which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional 
a Texas statute withholding state funding from local school dis- 
tricts for the education of children not legally admitted into the 
United States and authorizing local school districts to deny en- 
rollment to such children.141 A decade and a half after the deci- 
sion, Congress expressly sought to counteract the holding in the 
case, adopting in the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor- 
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996142 that it was the official immi- 
gration policy of the United States that "the availability of public 
benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United 
States" and that there is "a compelling government interest to 
14° 457 US 202 (1982). 141 Id at 205. 
142 Pub L No 104-193, 110 Stat 2105. 
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remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the 
availability of public benefits."143 But the error in Plyler precedes 
this explicit statement of congressional policy to the contrary, and 
here, finally, we get to the Corfield u Coryell 144 analogy and the 
sub silentio rejection of Corfield by both the Supreme Court in 
Plyler and the modern internationalists discussed at the outset of 
this Article who would eliminate national borders altogether. 
Granted, Corfield is a Privileges and Immunities Clause 
case, while Plyler is an Equal Protection case,145 but the claim by 
citizens for access to another state's resources that was rejected 
in Corfield should be stronger, not weaker, than the claim by il- 
legal immigrants for access to a state's resources that was ac- 
cepted in Plyler. The Privileges and Immunities Clause must 
provide something more to "citizens" than the Equal Protection 
Clause provides to all "persons," citizen and non-citizen alike, 
lest the Privileges and Immunities Clause - actually, both 
Clauses, that of Article IV and that of § 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment - be rendered entirely superfluous. 
Corfield involved a claim by a citizen from another state 
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,146 which 
requires each state to afford to citizens of other states the same 
privileges and immunities as it affords to its own citizens, enti- 
tled him to fish for oysters in the waters of New Jersey despite 
state law limiting such activity to the citizens of New Jersey.147 
Justice Bushrod Washington rejected the claim, noting that the 
court could not 
accede to the proposition . . . that, under [the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause], the citizens of the several states are 
permitted to participate in all the rights which belong ex- 
clusively to the citizens of any other particular state, merely 
upon the ground that they are enjoyed by those citizens; 
much less, that in regulating the use of the common proper- 
ty of the citizens of such state, the legislature is bound to 
143 8 USC § 1601(2)(B), (6). 144 6 F Cases 546 (CC ED Pa 1823). 
145 It should also be noted that Plyler is a decision of the Supreme Court while Cor- 
field is merely a decision rendered by a Supreme Court Justice while riding circuit. But 
given the heavy reliance placed on Corfield uring the debates over the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, I think it fair to elevate the 
case's standing for purposes of the present discussion. 146 US Const Art IV, § 2, cl 1. 
147 Corfield, 6 F Cases at 550. 
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extend to the citizens of all the other states the same ad- 
vantages as are secured to their own citizens.148 
The citizens of New Jersey, Justice Washington further ex- 
plained, "may be considered as tenants in common of this prop- 
erty; and they are so exclusively entitled to the use of it, that it 
cannot be enjoyed by others without the tacit consent, or the ex- 
press permission of the sovereign who has the power to regulate 
its use."149 
What was true of oysters in New Jersey is at least equally 
true of the public resources at issue in Plyler. Those public re- 
sources were owned by the citizens and lawful residents of Texas 
as something like tenants in common, who were thereby exclu- 
sively entitled to their use. The enjoyment of those public re- 
sources by others, therefore, could be had only with the tacit 
consent, or the express permission, of the sovereign. As the Tex- 
as law at issue in Plyler made clear, no such consent was forth- 
coming. The outcome in Plyler should therefore have been the 
same as the outcome in Corfield. Just as it was not a denial of 
the privileges and immunities of citizens from neighboring 
states not to be able to take New Jersey's oysters, and just as it 
would not be a denial of the privileges and immunities of citi- 
zens from neighboring states if Texas chose not to provide free 
public education to residents just across the Texas border in 
Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, or New Mexico were they to 
seek to come daily to Texas to avail themselves of the Texas ed- 
ucation system, neither should the Court in Plyler have held 
that those from foreign nations who were unlawfully present in 
Texas had an equal protection entitlement to a share of the 
common property of the lawful citizens and residents of that 
state. 
Justice William Brennan, who wrote the opinion for the 
Court in Plyler, noted that "few if any illegal immigrants come 
to this country, or presumably to the State of Texas, in order to 
avail themselves of a free education."150 But the holding in the 
case turned what may at the time have been a relatively inci- 
dental benefit into one of the three great magnets for illegal 
immigration. Since that decision, the rationale of the holding 
has been extended to medical services, housing, and other forms 
148 Id at 552. 
149 Id. 
150 Plyler, 457 US at 228. 
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of public assistance.151 The magnet thereby created by the Court 
in Plyler runs at cross-purposes with the immigration policies 
set by Congress. 
A similar analysis can be applied to some court decisions in 
the employment context. As the Supreme Court recognized in 
Sure-Tan, lne v NLRB ,152 a "primary purpose in restricting im- 
migration is to preserve jobs for American workers."153 While the 
job market is not as clearly a public good as, say, oysters in New 
Jersey or free public education in Texas, there is certainly a 
sense in which the legal institutions of this nation provide, at 
some significant cost to the taxpayers, the rule-of-law climate 
that fosters a favorable economy and job market. Judicial deci- 
sions that encourage participation in that market by those who 
are not authorized by Congress to be legally employed in this 
country, therefore, also run at cross-purposes to congressional 
immigration and naturalization policy. Indeed, "it is impossible 
for an undocumented alien to obtain employment in the United 
States without some party directly contravening explicit con- 
gressional policies."154 
The prime example is the judicial developments that have 
occurred in the wake of Sure-Tan and Hoffman Plastic Com- 
pounds, lne v NLRB ,155 In Sure-Tan, Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that it was an unfair labor 
practice, in violation of the National Labor Relations Act,156 for 
an employer to notify federal immigration officials of the undoc- 
umented statuses of his employees, "solely because the employ- 
ees supported the Union."157 But she specifically acknowledged 
that the employer knew of the employees' illegal status before 
the union organizing activities,158 and also that federal immigra- 
tion law at the time did not make it illegal for employers to em- 
ploy illegal immigrants or for illegal immigrants to accept em- 
ployment.159 Those important caveats have not proved to limit 
the reach of the decision, however. Nor has the Supreme Court's 
151 See Lewis v Grinker, 794 F Supp 1193, 1203-04 (EDNY 1991) (invoking the deci- 
sion in Plyler in holding that denial of prenatal care to children of aliens violated the 
Equal Protection Clause). 152 467 US 883 (1984). 153 Id at 893. 
154 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Ine v NLRB, 535 US 137, 148 (2002). 155 535 US 137 (2002). 
156 Pub L No 74-198, ch 372, 49 Stat 449 (1935), codified at29 USC § 151 et seq. 157 Sure-Tan, 467 US at 888, 894-95. 
158 Id at 887. 
159 Id at 892-93. See also INA § 101 et seq, 8 USC § 1101 et seq. 
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subsequent ruling in Hoffman Plastics, holding that those who 
are ineligible for employment because of their undocumented 
status are not entitled to back pay following a successful unfair 
labor practices claim.160 
Shortly after Hoffman Plastics, for example, the Ninth Cir- 
cuit considered, in Rivera v NIBCO, Ine,161 an employer's chal- 
lenge to a protective order forbidding discovery about immigra- 
tion status.162 The case involved alleged national origin 
discrimination in violation of Title VII; the employer had given a 
basic job skills examination in English. Despite the fact that 
plaintiffs' requested relief included back pay, relief that would 
be foreclosed for any plaintiff who was unlawfully present in the 
United States, the Ninth Circuit upheld the protective order, 
finding that such discovery would have a chilling effect even on 
documented workers.163 
Similarly, in the 2006 case of EEOC v Restaurant Co,164 the 
District Court for Minnesota denied an employer's motion to 
compel discovery about the immigration status of a former em- 
ployee who had filed a Title VII complaint for sexual harassment 
and retaliation.165 The record reflected that whatever sexual 
harassment there may have been was committed by the employ- 
ee's supervisor without knowledge or sanction by the employer, 
and that the employer immediately undertook to investigate the 
charges, likely rendering the harassment charge against the 
company itself unlikely of success.166 But the retaliation claim 
was another matter. The record reflects that during the course 
of the investigation, the employee revealed to the employer that 
she had not complained previously of the harassing conduct be- 
cause she was unlawfully present in the country and therefore 
feared deportation.167 Because continued employment of such an 
individual would have been a criminal offense by the employer 
at the time the events occurred (unlike in 1984, when Sure-Tan 
was decided), the employer advised the employee that federal 
160 Hoffman, 535 US at 149. 161 364 F3d 1057 (9th Cir 2004). 162 Id at 1061. 
163 Id at 1065. 
164 448 F Supp 2d 1085 (D Minn 2006). 165 Id at 1088. 
166 EEOC v Restaurant Co, 490 F Supp 2d 1039, 1044-45 (D Minn 2007). 167 Id at 1045. 
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law required it to have valid 1-9 forms on each employee,168 and 
asked her to complete a new one. She never returned to work, 
claiming instead that the 1-9 request was a constructive dis- 
charge and therefore unlawful retaliation. The EEOC, which 
was pursuing the claim on behalf of the employee, opposed the 
employer's discovery request on the ground that it was unduly 
burdensome, and the District Court rejected the employer's mo- 
tion to compel.169 
As a consequence of these rulings, employers can be held li- 
able for retaliation merely for seeking to ascertain the lawful 
immigration status of their employees, thereby insulating illegal 
immigrant employees from such inquiries. The employment 
magnet for illegal immigration thus grows stronger. 
Finally, there is the issue of birthright citizenship, the third 
most important magnet for current illegal immigration. Alth- 
ough the common understanding is that mere birth on US soil is 
sufficient to gain US citizenship, the language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment actually contains two requirements: "All persons 
born ... in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State where- 
in they reside."170 Modern parlance interprets the phrase, "sub- 
ject to the jurisdiction," to mean simply subject to our laws, ren- 
dering it almost entirely redundant to the first phrase. The 
debates in Congress during the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment suggest a different interpretation, however, one 
that distinguishes between mere territorial jurisdiction and a 
broader, more complete, allegiance-owing jurisdiction.171 Think 
of it this way: A foreign tourist visiting the United States sub- 
jects himself to the laws of the United States while here. An 
Englishman must drive on the right side of the road rather than 
the left, for example, when visiting here. But he cannot be pros- 
ecuted for treason if he takes up arms against the United States 
because he owes no allegiance to the United States. He is subject 
to the partial, territorial jurisdiction while here but not to the 
broader jurisdiction that would follow him beyond the borders. 
168 See INA § 274A(b), 8 USC § 1324a(b). See also INA § 274A(a)(2), 8 USC 
§ 1324a(a)(2) (stating that an employer must discharge an employee upon discovery of 
his undocumented status); INA § 274A(e)(4)(A), 8 USC § 1324a(e)(4)(A) (establishing civ- 
il penalties for employer's failure to comply); INA § 274A(f)(l), 8 USC § 1324a(f)(l) (es- 
tablishing criminal penalties for employer's failure to comply). 169 Restaurant Co, 448 F Supp 2d at 1088. 170 US Const Amend XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 171 See HR 127, 39th Cong, 1st Sess (May 30, 1866), in Cong Globe 2893. 
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The issue whether the children of illegal immigrants are 
"subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States in the way in- 
tended by this language has never been definitively addressed 
by the Supreme Court. That is, there is no holding to that effect 
by the Supreme Court, only dicta in three cases: United States v 
Wong Kim Ark,172 INS v Rios-Pineda ,173 and Ply 1er. 17 4 In Wong 
Kim Ark the Court held that the children of lawful, permanent 
residents were automatic citizens by virtue of their birth,175 but 
it had previously held in Elk v Wilkins ,176 a decision left in place 
by Wong Kim Ark, that the children of Native Americans were 
not automatic citizens by birth because, owing primary alle- 
giance to their tribe, a separate sovereign, they were not subject 
to the full and complete jurisdiction of the United States.177 
So what exactly does the Citizenship Clause of the Four- 
teenth Amendment mean? As I have argued elsewhere, I think 
the legislative history is more consistent with the view that in 
adopting the Citizenship Clause, as with its predecessor in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 178 Congress did not intend to provide for 
a broad and absolute birthright citizenship.179 The 1866 Act pro- 
vides, "All persons born in the United States and not subject to 
any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby de- 
clared to be citizens of the United States."180 As this formulation 
makes clear, any child born on US soil to parents who were tem- 
porary visitors to this country and who, as a result of the foreign 
citizenship of the child's parents, remained a citizen or subject of 
the parents' home country, was not entitled to claim the birth- 
right citizenship provided in the 1866 Act. That was the view 
first espoused by the Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, in the 
Slaughter-House Cases;181 it was the view espoused by the Court, 
this time as a holding, in Elk ;182 and it was the view articulated 
172 169 US 649, 693 (1898). 173 471 US 444, 450 (1985). 174 Plyler, 457 US at 215. 175 Wong Kim Ark , 169 US at 705. 176 112 US 94 (1884). 177 Id at 118-19. 
178 Ch 31, 14 Stat 27, codified as amended in various ections of Title 42. 179 See, for example, John C. Eastman, Born in the U.S.A.? Rethinking Birthright 
Citizenship in the Wake of 9/11, 12 Tex Rev L & Polit 167, 170-74 (2007). 180 Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1, ch 31, 14 Stat at 27. 181 83 US (16 Wall) 36, 91 (1873). 182 Elk, 112 US at 101-02. 
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by the most prominent constitutional commentator of the era, 
Thomas Cooley.183 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's holding in Wong Kim 
Ark, or more precisely the expansive gloss that has subsequently 
been given to that holding, established the magnet of birthright 
citizenship that also serves to undermine congressional immi- 
gration policy. Moreover, Justice Horace Gray's position for the 
Court in that case is simply at odds with the notion of consent 
that underlay the sovereign's power over naturalization. What it 
meant, fundamentally, was that foreign nationals could secure 
American citizenship for their children unilaterally, merely by 
giving birth on American soil, whether their arrival on Ameri- 
ca's shores was legal or illegal, temporary or permanent. 
In dicta, Justice Gray contended that the children of two 
classes of foreigners were not entitled to the birthright citizen- 
ship he thought guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment: 
first, the children of ambassadors and other foreign diplomats 
who, as the result of the fiction of extraterritoriality, were not 
even considered subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States; and second, the children of invading armies born 
on US soil while it was occupied by the foreign army.184 But 
apart from that, all children of foreign nationals who managed 
to be born on US soil were, in his formulation, citizens of the 
United States. Children born of parents who had been offered 
permanent residence but were not yet citizens and who, as a re- 
sult, had not yet renounced allegiance to their prior sovereign 
would become citizens by birth on US soil. This was true even if, 
as was the case in Wong Kim Ark itself, the parents were, by 
treaty, unable ever to become citizens. This was the extent of the 
actual holding of the case.185 
The dictum was much broader, of course. Children of parents 
residing only temporarily in the United States on a work or stu- 
dent visa would also become US citizens if the dictum were to be- 
come binding precedent. Children of parents who had overstayed 
their temporary visa would also become US citizens, even though 
born of parents who were now here illegally. And, perhaps most 
183 See Thomas M. Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional L w in the Unit- 
ed States of America 270 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1898) (noting that, "subject o the jurisdic- 
tion" of the United States "meant [ ] full and complete jurisdiction to which citizens [are 
generally] subject, and not any qualified and partial jurisdiction, such as may consist 
with allegiance to some other government"). 184 Wong Kim Ark , 169 US at 686. 18& Id at 705. 
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troubling from the consent rationale, children of parents who 
never were in the United States legally would also become citi- 
zens as the direct result of the illegal action by their parents. This 
would be true even if the parents were nationals of a regime at 
war with the United States and even if the parents were here to 
commit acts of sabotage against the United States, at least so 
long as the sabotage did not actually involve occupying a portion 
of the territory of the United States.186 The notion that the fram- 
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment, when seeking to guarantee 
the right of citizenship to former slaves, also sought to guaran- 
tee citizenship to the children of enemies of the United States 
who were in our territory illegally is simply too absurd to be a 
credible interpretation of the Citizenship Clause. 
This is not to say that Congress could not, pursuant to its 
naturalization power, choose to grant citizenship to the children 
of foreign nationals. But thus far it has not done so. Instead, the 
language of the current naturalization statute simply tracks the 
minimum constitutional guarantee - anyone born in the United 
States, and subject to its jurisdiction, is a citizen.187 Understand- 
ing that constitutional phrase is therefore as necessary now as it 
was in 1884 and 1898. 
By effectively writing that clause out of the Constitution, 
beyond the actual holding of Wong Kim Ark to the assumptions 
in obiter dicta contained in Rios-Pinedaies and Plyler,189 the 
Court has given to alien Corfields not just the oysters that the 
people of the United States own in common, but the pearl itself, 
a share in the sovereignty of another people, without having to 
go through the trouble of obtaining consent or otherwise pursu- 
ing the path toward legal naturalization. Such a rule undermines 
not only the immigration policy choices made by Congress and the 
plenary authority given to Congress in Article I of the Constitution 
to make them, but the very principle of "consent of the governed" 
that lies at the heart of the Declaration of Independence. Only an 
unambiguous constitutional text should compel such a result. Giv- 
en that the ratification history of the Citizenship Clause is at least 
open to, and in my view leans heavily toward, the meaning that 
"subject to the jurisdiction" was not synonymous with "born in the 
United States" - that it meant subject to the complete, rather than 
186 Id at 693. 
187 INA § 301(a), 8 USC § 1401(a). lao mos-ťineaa, 471 US at 446. 1Ba Plyler, 457 US at 215. 
This content downloaded from 206.211.139.182 on Thu, 13 Nov 2014 19:27:38 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2013] Have the Courts Forgotten about Corfield v Coryell? 199 
merely partial or territorial, jurisdiction - that standard has not 
been met. 
Conclusion 
In sum, recent judicial decisions dealing with benefits, em- 
ployment, and even citizenship itself have strengthened the 
magnetic lure of illegal immigration. This has undermined the 
policy choices made by Congress and, effectively, treated the re- 
sources, opportunities, and sovereignty of this nation not as the 
common property of the people of the United States, but as fair 
game for anyone the world over who can cross our borders and 
stake their claim. Justice Washington's reasoning in Corfield 
needs a revival! 
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